Towards a privacy-preserving solution for OSNs by Tang, Qiang
Towards a Privacy-Preserving Solution for OSNs
Qiang Tang
APSIA group, SnT, University of Luxembourg
6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, L-1359 Luxembourg
qiang.tang@uni.lu
Abstract. In this short paper, we describe a solution to protect users’ pri-
vacy in online social networks (OSNs). The solution achieves the following
functionalities: (1) it enables users to store their private data securely; (2)
it enables users, from the same or different OSNs, to compute their simi-
larity through a secure protocol; (3) it enables similar users to establish a
session key for secure communication. Different from existing solutions in
the literature,which often rely on a global public key infrastructure or/and
traditional key distribution techniques, the proposed solution leverages
on the trust between friends and the entropy of users’ private attributes.
1 Introduction
Online social networks (OSNs) provide the service that connects classmates,
friends, and other people who share similar interests and activities across po-
litical, economic, and geographic borders. As surveyed in [1], a large number
of OSNs exist, among which Facebook, MySpace, Google +, and Twitter are the
most popular ones.
Due to their nature, OSNs can easily collect a huge amount of user data.
Among all kinds of OSN data, a particularly important one is profile attributes.
In most OSNs, profile attributes consist of a lot of information, ranging from
name, address, education background to political views, hobbies, and daily
activities. All attributes are available in plaintext to the OSN service providers
and, depending on the configurations, some of them are available to third
parties. It is not surprising that a subset of the profile attributes can already
identify a user, even after anonymization [4, 6]. Therefore, it is an interesting
task to design a solution for users to: (1) protect their private profile attributes;
(2) establish friendship with strangers based on their profile similarities (this
is the main reason why users want to publish their profiles). This implies that
the solution should partially resolve the privacy-functionality tension [8], by
simultaneously providing privacy protection for profile attributes and allowing
users to conveniently compute their profile similarities.
In reality, it is reasonable to assume that most users are involved in multiple
OSNs. Now, suppose that both Alice and Bob are enrolled in Facebook and
Myspace, and they have the same location attribute in Facebook and the same
music taste attribute inMyspace. Due to the different focuses of the OSNs, Alice
and Bob may not disclose their location information in Myspace, at the same
time they may not disclose their music taste information in Facebook. It will
not be a surprise that Alice and Bob are not friends in Facebook and Myspace,
because they do not sharemuch in common in either of the OSNs. If they realize
their common attributes in both OSNs, Alice and Bob may like to consider each
other as a friend and attend somemusic event together in the city. This indicates
that it is desirable to have a solution which works across multiple OSNs.
1.1 Our Contribution
The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, we describe some new crypto-
graphic building blocks and briefly analyze their security properties, including
a unilateral set intersection cardinality protocol and a unilateral comparison
protocol. Secondly, we propose a solution for protecting users’ private profile
attributes in OSNs. In the solution, a transitive and uni-directional proxy re-
encryption scheme [5] allows users to encrypt their private profile attributes
with their own public keys. Based on the unilateral set intersection cardinality
protocol, we design an Online-Oﬄine profile matching protocol, which allows
two users to compute their profile similarity and one of them can stay oﬄine.
Based on the unilateral comparison protocol and a fuzzy extractor scheme [3],
we design anOnline-Online profilematching protocol, which allows two online
users to compute their profile similarity. Thirdly,we observe that users’ commu-
nications are under surveillance by the OSN service providers. So, we propose
a secure channel establishment protocol which allows two users to exchange a
session key if they share a certain number of common private profile attributes.
1.2 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
new building blocks which will be used later on. In Section 3, we briefly de-
scribe the proposed solution. In Section 4, we provide the details of the profile
matching protocols and a secure channel establishment protocol, employed in
the proposed solution. In Section 5, we conclude the paper.
2 New Cryptographic Building Blocks
Theproposed solutionemploys transitive anduni-directionalproxy re-encryption
cryptosystem , namely (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Pextract,Preenc) [5], and the follow-
ing two new protocols.
2.1 Unilateral Set Intersection Cardinality Protocol
Let ℓ be the security parameter, n > 1 be an integer and F = Zq where q is
a prime number (i.e. F is a finite field). We assume that the bit-length of q is
a polynomial of the security parameter ℓ and n < q. Consider the following
client-server setting: the server possesses a polynomial R(x) ∈ F[x]; the client
possesses a polynomial Q(x) ∈ F[x] and ci (1 ≤ i ≤ n) ∈ F. Suppose that R(x)
and Q(x) are of degree n, and the roots of F (x) = R(x) + Q(x) are denoted as
di(1 ≤ i ≤ n) ∈ F. Based on Paillier scheme [7], the following protocol allows the
client to learn the cardinality of the set intersection between ci (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and di
(1 ≤ i ≤ n), while the server learns nothing.
1. The server generates a paillier key pair (PKs, SKs), where the public key is
PKs = (Ns, gs). The client generates a paillier key pair (PKc, SKc), where the
public key is PKc = (Nc, gc). then, they exchange and validate their public
keys. Here, we assume that q5 < Ns and q < Nc, so that the polynomial
coefficients and roots can be directly encrypted by both public keys.
2. The server encrypts its polynomial R(x) and sends the ciphertext [R(x)]PKs
to the client. Note that [R(x)]PKs is a vector, consisting of the ciphertexts of
R(x)’s coefficients under PKs.
3. For every attribute ci (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the client does the following: (1) compute
[R(ci)]PKs based on [R(x)]PKs and ci; (2) compute Q(ci) and its ciphertext
[Q(ci)]PKs ; (3) compute [F (ci)]PKs based on [R(ci)]PKs and [Q(ci)]PKs ; (4) select
yi ∈R Zq4 and compute the randomized value [F (ci) + yi]PKs ; (5) compute
y′
i
= yi mod q and [Nc − y
′
i
]PKc . After all the computations, the client sends
F (ci) + yi]PKs , [Nc − y
′
i
]PKc (1 ≤ i ≤ n) to the server.
4. After receiving the values from the client, for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the server
does the following: (1) decrypt [F (ci)+ yi]PKs to obtainF (ci)+ yi; (2) compute
Ti = F (ci)+ yi mod q which is equal toF (ci)+ y
′
i
mod q; (3) select y′′
i
∈R Nc
and compute Ri = ([Ti]PKc · [Nc − y
′
i
]PKc)
y′′
i mod N2c . After all the computa-
tions, the server sends a randomly permuted version of {Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ n)} to
the client.
5. The client decrypts Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ n), and count the number of 0s as the
intersection size.
2.2 Unilateral Comparison Protocol
Let G be a group of prime order p, and H2 : {0, 1}
∗ → G and H3 : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}ℓ
be two hash functions. If a client wants to test whether his value S is equal to
the value S′ of the server, then the client initiates the protocol shown in Fig. 1.
Client (S) Server (S′)
x ∈R Zp y ∈R Zp
H2(S)
x
−−−−→
H3(H2(S
′)y), H2(S)
xy
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
H3(H2(S
′)y)
?
= H3(H2(S)
xyx−1)
Fig. 1. Unilateral Comparison Protocol
3 The Proposed Solution for OSNs
We generally assume that there is a semi-trust relationship among friends in
OSNs. By ”semi-trust”, we mean that if Alice semi-trusts Bob then she can
assume that Bob will not collude with a third-party or reveal her private in-
formation. Moreover, we assume that the semi-trust relationship is unilateral,
which means that ”Alice semi-trusts Bob” does not immediately imply ”Bob
semi-trusts Alice”. Furthermore, we assume that the semi-trust relationship
is transitive: if Alice semi-trusts Bob, Bob semi-trusts Charlie, then Alice will
semi-trust Charlie.
There is a PPCP server, which is semi-trusted to every user in the system.
Therefore, users donot need to fully trust the PPCP server to store their plaintext
attributes. Compared with any current OSN, where users need to fully trust the
service providers, this is an improvement. Every user can communicate with
the PPCP server through a secure channel. Moreover, the PPCP server is trusted
to publish the following parameters, used by all users.
– Security parameter: ℓ.
– ElGamal parameter: a multiplicative group G of degree p, a generator g,
and three cryptographic hash functions H0 : G → Zp, H1 : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}L,
H2 : {0, 1}
∗ → G, and H3 : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}ℓ where L is a polynomial of the
security parameter.
– Profile encapsulation parameter: a finite field F = Zq where q is a prime
number. We assume that the attributes fall into F.
Let all the users be denoted as Ui (1 ≤ i ≤ N), where N is an integer, and
Ui’s attributes be denoted as Ai = {hi, j (1 ≤ j ≤ n)}. The proposed solution
is composed of three services, including the secure profile storage service, the
secure profile matching service, and the secure communication service. They
are described in detail below.
3.1 Secure Profile Storage Service
Ui registers at the PPCP server and obtains an identifier IDi. Moreover, Ui
generates an ElGamal public/private key pair (PKi, SKi), where (SKi = xi,PKi =
gxi ), following the specification in [5] based on the ElGamal parameter.Ui sends
the public parameters (IDi,PKi) to its friends.
1. Ui chooses a subset of his friends that he semi-trusts, denoted as Uix (1 ≤
x ≤ Ni).
2. Ui performs the following operations.
(a) Generate re-encryption keys RKi→ix for every (1 ≤ x ≤ Ni), which is
identified by (IDi, IDix).
(b) Based on his attributes hi, j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), generate Fi(x),Qi(x),Ri(x) ∈ F[x]
of degree n as follows: Fi(x) =
∏n
j=1(x− hi, j), Fi(x) = Qi(x)+Ri(x),where
the coefficients of Ri(x) are randomly chosen from F.
(c) Based on the ElGamal encryption algorithmEnc specified in [5], encrypt
Qi(x) using PKi to obtain [Qi(x)]PKi = (g
ri , gri·xi · ti,H1(ti) ⊕ Qi(x)), where
ri ∈R Zp, ti ∈R G, Qi(x) represents the coefficients of Qi(x).
3. Ui stores (PKi, RKi→ix (1 ≤ x ≤ Ni), Ri(x), [Qi(x)]PKi) at the PPCP server, and
associates the data to his identifier IDi. He keeps SKi private locally.
With users’ data, the PPCP server can construct a social graph G of the semi-
trust relationships among users. In this graph, there is a directed edge from Ui
to U j if Ui semi-trusts U j (i.e. Ui has generated a re-encryption key RKi→ j).
3.2 Secure Profile Matching Service (i.e. Friendship Establishment)
Suppose that U j has obtained some public information about Ui and consider
himas a potential friend. For example,Uimayhave publish his identifier IDi and
some hobby information at Facebook, and U j surfed to Ui’s page and obtained
the information. Then, U j can send IDi to the PPCP server and request to match
with Ui. When the PPCP server receives a request, it first checks whether Ui is
online. If so, it check Ui’s policy, which can have two possibilities.
1. IfUi prefers to run the Online-Online protocol described in Section 4.2when
he is online, then U j and Ui run the protocol.
2. If Ui prefers not to be involved in the matching, the PPCP server tries to
find the shortest semi-trust link from Ui to U j. If the length of the link is
within a threshold agreed by Ui, then the PPCP server represents Ui to run
the Online-Oﬄine protocol described in Section 4.1with U j. Otherwise,U j’s
request is rejected.
If Ui is oﬄine, the PPCP server checks Ui’s policy to see whether he wants
his profile to bematchedwhen he is oﬄine. If so, the PPCP server does the same
as in the aforementioned possibility 2. Otherwise, U j’s request is rejected.
3.3 Secure Communication Service
Suppose that there is a semi-trust link from U j to Ui, and these two users want
to protect their communications. Then, then they can run the secure channel
establishment protocol described in Section 4.3. Note that the existence of semi-
trust link implies that U j and Ui share a certain number of common profile
attributes, therefore, the protocol will generate a common session key for them.
4 The Employed Protocols
In this section, we describe two profile matching protocols and a secure channel
establishment protocol, that are refereed to in the previous section.
4.1 Online-OﬄineMatching Protocol
Suppose that a user U j wants to match his profile with Ui and there is a semi-
trust link from Ui to U j, namely there is a chain of proxy re-encryption keys
(RKi→i1 ,RKi1→i2 , · · · ,RKit→ j) from Ui to U j. In this case, the following protocol is
carried out between U j and the PPCP server.
1. In the first stage, the polynomial Qi(x) is transferred to U j. In more detail,
the PPCP server performs a series of re-encryptions to transform [Qi(x)]PKi
into [Qi(x)]PK j using the chain of re-encryption keys. From [Qi(x)]PK j , U j can
recoverQi(x) using his own private key SK j. At the end of this stage, U j has
Qi(x) and his own attributes A j = {h j,t (1 ≤ t ≤ n)}, and the PPCP server
possess Ri(x).
2. In the second stage,U j and thePPCPserver run theunilateral set intersection
cardinality protocol, specified in Section 2.1, where U j and the PPCP server
play the roles of the client and the server respectively. At the end of the
protocol execution, U j learns her profile simplicity with Ui.
4.2 Online-OnlineMatching Protocol
The proposed protocol makes use of a (U, ℓ1, ℓ2, t, ǫ)-fuzzy extractor [3], where
U is the domain of profile attribute set. When U j is the initiator, the proposed
protocol proceeds in two stages.
1. In the first stage, U j and Ui engage in a protocol, shown in Fig. 2, where H1
is defined in Section 3.
Uj Ui
(A j = {h j,t (1 ≤ t ≤ n)}) (Ai = {hi,t (1 ≤ t ≤ n)})
(r j, h j) = Gen((h j,1, · · · , h j,n))
h j
−→
(ri, hi) = Gen((hi,1, · · · , hi,n))
hi
←−
r′i = Rep(A j, hi) r
′
j = Rep(Ai, h j)
ck j = H1(IDi||ID j||hi||r
′
i
||h j||r j) cki = H1(IDi||ID j||hi||ri||h j||r
′
j
)
Fig. 2. Online Matching Protocol (Stage 1)
2. In the second stage,U j initiates the unilateral comparison protocol, specified
in Section 2.2, to test whether ck j = cki.
4.3 Secure Channel Establishment Protocol
As in Section 4.2, the proposed protocol combines a (U, ℓ1, ℓ2, t, ǫ)-fuzzy ex-
tractor scheme [3] and a secure password-based authenticated key exchange
(PAKE) scheme. Note that a lot of PAKE schemes exist in the literature, Boyd
and Mathuria [2] provided a survey for those proposed before 2004. In more
detail, when U j initiates the protocol with Ui, then they perform as follows.
1. In the first stage, they run the protocol shown in Fig. 2 to establish some
ephemeral secrets. U j generates ck j = H1(IDi||ID j||hi||r
′
i
||h j||r j) and Ui gener-
ates cki = H1(IDi||ID j||hi||ri||h j||r
′
j
). Note that if the distance between Ai and
A j is smaller than t, then ck j = cki.
2. In the second stage, they run a secure PAKE scheme to establish a session
key. The key materials of ck j and cki are used as the passwords.
5 Conclusion
In this short paper, we have briefly outlined a privacy-preserving solution
for OSNs. The solution provides three services, including the secure profile
storage service, the secure profile matching service, and the secure commu-
nication service. More details about the proposed solution and the associated
protocols can be found in the full version of this paper, which is available at:
http://tonyrhul.wordpress.com.
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